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Abstract
The acquisition of citizenship status in the new country of residence may depend on
(1) the individual immigrant’s characteristics, (2) the structural characteristics of both
the origin and the destination countries and (3) institutional factors in the
destination country including policy factors, specifically the national citizenship
policies. Although almost all European countries have shifted from a ‘nationalist’ to a
more ‘multiculturalist’ citizenship policy, thus formally liberalising the access to
citizenship rights, in Europe the opportunities for obtaining citizenship status in the
new country of residence are still quite limited for many immigrants and their
descendants. In addition, the conditions under which immigrants become
naturalised citizens vary widely between countries. Indeed, there are many
differences in policies on the right to citizenship in terms of the residence
requirements for naturalisation, citizenship by birth, acceptance of dual citizenship
and language requirements. The aim of this paper is to examine, through a logistic
regression model with cluster-robust standard errors, the effect of both individual-
level characteristics and measures of national citizenship policies on the likelihood of
citizenship status amongst young and adult immigrants living in six European
countries, i.e. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain, using data from
the Immigrant Citizens Survey (ICS). The results show a considerable effect of
individual characteristics on citizenship status. However, the effect of policy factors is
also important. In particular, a lower residence requirement for naturalisation and a
more inclusive environment favour immigrants becoming citizens of the new
country of residence.
Keywords: Citizenship, Immigrant integration, European countries, Traditional
national models of integration, Requirements for naturalisation, Immigrant Citizens
Survey (ICS)
Introduction
A large body of literature has stressed the role played by citizenship status in the process
of immigrant integration into the country of residence (e.g. Bauböck, 2006; Favell, 2003;
Peters, Vink, & Schmeets, 2015). In particular, there is general agreement on citizenship
status as an objective indicator of integration (e.g. Portes & Curtis, 1987; Yang, 1994).
Citizenship status represents only one component of the entire integration process and it
does not therefore necessarily imply the social acceptance of immigrants and their sense
of belonging to the host society (Alba & Foner, 2016). However, by granting them the
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same status and rights as natives, citizenship status formally reduces the gap between the
new and the original citizens, by creating parity between them, one of the main goals of
the integration process (Vink, 2013).
The acquisition of citizenship status in the new country of residence may depend on
(1) the individual immigrant’s characteristics, such as demographic, human capital and
the so-called ‘immigration’ variables (e.g. years since migration, age at arrival and rea-
son for migration) (Amit, 2010), (2) the structural characteristics of both the origin and
the destination countries and (3) institutional factors in the destination country. The
last includes policy factors, specifically the national citizenship policies, which establish
who is eligible for naturalisation (Peters et al., 2015).
Although almost all European countries have shifted from a ‘nationalist’ to a more
‘multiculturalist’ citizenship policy, thus formally liberalising the access to citizenship
rights (Joppke, 2008, 2010), in Europe the opportunities for obtaining citizenship status
in the new country of residence are still quite limited for many immigrants and their
descendants (Howard, 2005, 2009). For instance, it has become harder to be eligible for
citizenship, because of the civic integration requirements for applicants, such as
mandatory courses, tests and contracts (Wallace Goodman, 2012), whose implications
have been recently much criticised (e.g. FitzGerald, Cook-Martín, García, & Arar, 2018;
Neureiter, 2018). In addition, the conditions under which immigrants become natura-
lised citizens vary widely between countries. Indeed, there are many differences in pol-
icies on the right to citizenship in terms of the residence requirements for
naturalisation, citizenship by birth, acceptance of dual citizenship and language require-
ments (e.g. Dronkers & Vink, 2010). These differences originate from structural varia-
tions in the implementation of policies and from attitudes towards immigrants, which
mainly depend on a country’s experience of immigration and on the degree to which
the phenomenon is accepted (Freeman, 1995). They have resulted in the institutionali-
sation of different integration regimes and thus in the development of the traditional
national models of immigration and integration.
As it will be noted in the next section, in the last two decades, countries have con-
verged around policies of civic integration, which emphasise the importance of a know-
ledge of the language, the culture and the civic values of the host society for entry,
residence and naturalisation of immigrants, making boundaries between national pol-
icies more blurred than in the past. However, I argue that, in combination with these
recent policy developments, the traditional national immigration and integration
models represent a heritage of paramount importance, which should not be overlooked
when examining how both individual factors and policy factors affect the acquisition of
citizenship status by immigrants in Europe (Reitz, Simon, & Laxer, 2017). Of course,
the European convergence towards civic integration blurred the boundaries of the trad-
itional national immigration and integration models. However, the interpretation of
civic integration and the subsequent granting of residence and citizenship rights to for-
eign citizens is still not uniform but adapted to the different traditional models to
which countries belong. The case of Italy is emblematic of this process, as will be disen-
tangled in the ‘Discussion and conclusions’ section.
In the light of the above considerations, the aim of this paper is to examine, through
a logistic regression model with cluster-robust standard errors, the effect of both
individual-level characteristics and measures of national citizenship policies on the
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likelihood of citizenship status amongst young and adult immigrants living in selected
European countries, i.e. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain, using
data from the Immigrant Citizens Survey (ICS). Specifically, our research questions are
as follows: Which factors influence immigrant citizenship status the most? Do national
citizenship policies affect the citizenship status of immigrants living in European coun-
tries? Are the traditional national immigration and integration models helpful in inter-
preting the results?
Compared to previous studies (the most recent and most comprehensive is Dronkers
& Vink, 2012), I explore citizenship status amongst immigrants who are not born in
the country of residence and who have acquired the citizenship after migration (there-
fore not at birth). I think that this is an innovative aspect whose results may have im-
portant policy implications for European host societies, in terms of the factors to take
into account in order to influence the granting of citizenship rights to foreign popula-
tions, especially in a period of increase of populist and nationalist movements in
Europe.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. The second section describes the
traditional national models of immigration and integration and the citizenship regimes
in the six European countries; the third section presents an overview of the main indi-
vidual factors and policy factors influencing citizenship status amongst immigrants.
This is followed by a description of the data, measures and method in the third section
and by the presentation of the main results of the analysis in the fifth section. Finally,
the last section concludes the paper with a discussion on how the traditional national
immigration and integration models may explain the research findings.
Traditional national models of immigration and integration and citizenship
regimes in six European countries
The academic literature generally distinguishes between four traditional national immi-
gration and integration models: the exclusionist model, the assimilationist model, the
multiculturalist or pluralist model and the ‘new’ immigration countries model or
Southern European model (e.g. Koopmans & Statham, 1999; Peixoto et al., 2012).
The exclusionist integration model (Germany and Austria) mainly considers migration
as a short-term phenomenon and, in particular, as a means of meeting short-term
labour demands (Gastarbeiter). Countries fitting this model are fairly averse to perman-
ent settlement, family reunification and immigrant naturalisation. An ethnic under-
standing of nationhood is at the core of citizenship rights, and consequently these are
granted according to the principle of ius sanguinis. For instance, the German National-
ity Act of 1999, but entered into force in 2000, introduced citizenship at birth for those
born in Germany, if at least one parent has a permanent residence permit and has been
residing in Germany for at least 8 years (8 years are also required for first-generation
immigrants to naturalise—with the 1913 Law, 15 years were needed). However, children
have to renounce to their parents’ nationality and to make the decision between the
age of 18 and 23 (Green, 2005). This is called ‘optional model’ and implies that if the
applicant declares an intention to keep German citizenship, he or she is obliged to
prove the loss or renouncement of the foreign nationality; otherwise, if the applicant
does not declare anything on reaching the age of 18, he or she will lose his or her
German nationality (Hailbronner & Farahat, 2015). The Immigration Act of 2004
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introduced integration requirements, making the right to naturalisation dependent
upon a proof of sufficient knowledge of the German language. In addition, successful
attendance at an integration course, consisting of a language course and a course on
the German history and the political system, reduces the required time of lawful resi-
dence for naturalisation from 8 to 7 years. However, it facilitated the dual citizenship
for European Union (EU) citizens and worsened that for non-EU ones (Palmowski,
2008). The 2007 reform of Nationality Law established that the sufficient knowledge of
the German language can be provided through a language certificate (level B) (Hail-
bronner & Farahat, 2015). The successful attendance at an integration course reduces
the required time of lawful residence for naturalisation from 8 to 7 years. Spouses of
foreign residents coming from Islamic countries are asked to prove the necessary evi-
dence of basic German skills through pre-entry tests. The 2014 reform established that
the ‘option duty’ will be waived for children of immigrants born in Germany who have
either 8 years of residence before turning 21, or have attended a German school for at
least 6 years. Only children who have not been raised in Germany are subject to the
‘option duty’. Therefore, the revisited German citizenship law has retained the ‘option
duty’ as a general principle (Hailbronner & Farahat, 2015).
According to the assimilationist model (France and Belgium), immigrants are primar-
ily expected to integrate into the host country as individuals and they are, therefore,
asked to accept and sincerely adopt the culture and values of their new country of resi-
dence. Consequently, as it is a recognisable sign of equality with mainstream society (a
reduction of differences), citizenship status is relatively easy to acquire. It is based on a
civic and territorial understanding of nationhood and therefore on a mixture of ius san-
guinis and ius soli. For instance, children born to foreign parents in France automatic-
ally become French when they reach 18 years old if they have resided in France for the
last 5 years (Weil, 2005). However, at the beginning of the 2000s, the limits of the as-
similationist paradigm in integrating immigrants and their descendants were
highlighted by several incidents, such as the rioting of young immigrants living in
France, and this led to a shift towards anti-discrimination policies in France (Bertossi,
2007; Escafré-Dublet, 2014). The rationale behind anti-discrimination policies is to ease
the burden on the immigrant to integrate into the host society, by making institutions,
such as schools and the labour market, more responsible for immigrant integration, try-
ing to guarantee them equity and emancipation within mainstream society. Moreover,
from 2007 onwards, immigrants have had to learn French and demonstrate their know-
ledge of French laws, signing the ‘Contrat d’accueil et de l’intégration’, in order to re-
quest a renewal of their permit of stay and the issuing of a permanent residency
permit. However, these policies have not led to the adoption of broader multicultural-
ism, which still appears to be quite a long way from the French method of immigrant
integration (Lépinard & Simon, 2009). The ban on religious symbols in public buildings
and the recent decrees against the use of full-body bathing suits (‘burkini’) at the sea-
side, which have been issued by 15 French municipalities, are two examples of how
anti-discrimination policies are strongly preserving the principle of secularism (laïcité)
alongside assimilationism.
With 5 years of uninterrupted residence, the acquisition of citizenship (so-called ‘by
declaration’) for first-generation immigrants is quite easy in Belgium, as in France. This
is because the access to citizenship is considered functional to the process of
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assimilation into the host country. As far as second-generation immigrants, children
born in Belgium of a Belgian parent and children born abroad of a Belgian parent (pro-
vided the latter was himself or herself born in Belgium), are considered Belgian, from
the age of 18. If both child and parent were born abroad, the parent must make a state-
ment before the child reaches the age of five, requesting that Belgian citizenship be
granted to the child (Foblets, Yanasmayan, & Wautelet, 2013). In Belgium, integration
has been a community competence since the 1980s; therefore, policies are different be-
tween Wallonia, Flanders and the Region of Brussels. In the last 10 years, Flanders have
been developing civic integration policies with the ‘Citizenisation’ policy, which,
through an ‘Integration Programme’, encourages the learning of the Flemish language,
values and norms amongst immigrants. ‘Integration Programmes’ are compulsory for
immigrants of 18 years and over who are registered in the National Register, are living
in a Flemish city and hold a first permit of stay of more than 3 months. The knowledge
of one of the three national languages is considered a requirement for being socially
and economically integrated and therefore to obtain the citizenship rights.
At the core of multiculturalism (Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden), there is the
idea that ethnic minorities’ identity, culture, language and religion should be preserved
and enhanced. Therefore, countries adopting multiculturalist policies tend to promote
ethnic particularisms rather than absorbing them into the majority group through as-
similation. However, citizenship rights are based on a combination of both ius sanguinis
and ius soli. For instance, the Dutch Citizenship Act of 1985 established that citizenship
could be granted to immigrants after 5 years of legal residence, and to children at the
age of 18 if they had lived in the Netherlands continuously since they were born. How-
ever, in 1998, the Netherlands introduced the ‘Newcomer Integration Law’, which estab-
lished that non-EU and non-Switzerland immigrants applying for a permanent
residence permit and immigrants applying for citizenship have to follow 600 h of lan-
guage, civic and labour market courses and to pass a civic test. Language and civic
knowledges are asked to family immigrants and immigrants who planned to perman-
ently reside in the Netherlands before leaving their country of origin, according to the
so-called principle of ‘integration from abroad’ (Paparusso, 2016).
The ‘new’ immigration countries model, or the Southern European model (Italy,
Greece, Portugal and Spain), is characterised by a relatively recent immigration history,
if compared to historical immigration countries, such as France, Germany and Britain:
mainly emigration countries until the mid-1970s, the Southern European countries
started to receive mass immigration in the 1990s (Freeman, 1995). Some common fea-
tures, as far as the management of migration inflows is concerned, characterise the
countries embedded in this model. In particular, one can observe a lack of selective im-
migration policies, a large underground economy attracting undocumented immigrants,
a strong segmentation of the labour market and the use of ex post instruments to pro-
vide a legal status to immigrants, such as regularizations, quota systems and flow de-
crees. To sum up, the main common characteristics of this model are (a) the timing
and the size of inflows, (b) the reasons for and the modes of entry and (c) the distinct-
ive manner of integration into the local labour market (Arango & Finotelli, 2009; King,
Lazaridis, & Tsardanidis, 2000).
Countries fitting this model show some notable differences, especially when citizen-
ship policies are considered. For instance, the Italian citizenship policy is mainly based
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on ius sanguinis: Italian-born foreign nationals under the age of 18 can apply for citi-
zenship within 1 year of turning 18 (Law n. 91/1992). On this regard, a reform of the
citizenship law, aimed at granting citizenship to children born in Italy from foreign par-
ents of which at least one holds the EU long-term residence permit (ius soli) and to
children arrived in Italy within 12 years of age and attended at least 5 years of school in
Italy (ius culturae), has been rejected in 2017 by the Senate of the Republic. On the
other hand, Portugal and Spain tend to combine elements of ius soli and ius sanguinis,
through the introduction of rather lower residency requirements for immigrants to
meet in order that their children acquire new citizenship status. For instance, children
born in a Portuguese territory to non-Portuguese parents may obtain citizenship rights
if their parents have resided in Portugal for 5 years, or if they have completed primary
school education in Portugal (Piçarra & Gil, 2012).
To sum up and focusing only on the countries covered by this study—i.e. Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain—in Belgium and France, 5 years of lawful
residence are required to first-generation immigrants to be naturalised. Children born
to foreign parents in France automatically become French when they reach 18 years
old, if they have resided in France for the last 5 years, whilst in Belgium, children born
in Belgium or abroad of a Belgian parent are considered Belgian. In Germany, 8 years
of residence are needed for first-generation immigrants to be naturalised; children of
immigrants born in Germany who either have 8 years of residence before turning 21,
or have attended a German school for at least 6 years, can become German. Only chil-
dren who have not been raised in Germany are subject to the ‘option duty’: they have
to declare their intention to keep German citizenship and to renounce to the national-
ity of origin. In Italy, non-EU, first-generation immigrants need 10 years of uninter-
rupted residence to be naturalised (EU, first-generation immigrants only need 4 years).
Italian-born foreign nationals under the age of 18 can apply for citizenship within 1 year
of turning 18. In Spain, first-generation immigrants who intend to acquire Spanish citi-
zenship require 10 years of residence, whereas in Portugal, 6 years are needed. Both
countries allow some nationalities coming from former colonies to easily acquire citi-
zenship without losing citizenship of their country of birth (only after 2 years of un-
interrupted legal residence for Spain). The access to citizenship for second-generation
immigrants is regulated by the principle of ius sanguinis in both Spain and Portugal.
Dual citizenship for first-generation immigrants is tolerated in all the countries consid-
ered by this study with the exception of Germany, where the ‘option duty’ is considered
the rule, albeit with some exceptions that mainly concern EU foreign citizens.
Table 1 provides the most important current citizenship law in the six selected coun-
tries and the eligible persons to citizenship by residence and by birth.
Explaining citizenship status amongst immigrants in Europe
Joppke (2010) explored the theoretical aspects of citizenship and immigration, specific-
ally those aspects of citizenship pertaining to immigration. He found that citizenship
entails status, formal membership of the state, rights, the set of rights, which distin-
guish citizens from residents, and identity, the ensemble of values, which link individ-
uals to the political community. These elements, which offer a measure of the degree
immigrants are incorporated into the host society (Bloemraad, Korteweg, & Yurdakul,
2008), can depend on either individual factors or policy factors.
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At an individual level, international literature (e.g. Dronkers & Vink, 2010; Piché,
2004; Yang, 1994) has highlighted that demographic, human capital and ‘immigration’
variables are key factors in explaining citizenship status amongst immigrants in the
new country of residence. Specifically, as far as the demographic variables are con-
cerned, age has a positive effect on the acquisition of citizenship status: the older immi-
grants are, the more likely they are to have citizenship status in the country of
residence. Females are more likely to acquire new citizenship status, as naturalisation
implies long-term settlement abroad and this represents a form of emancipation from
their country of origin and its rules (Dronkers & Vink, 2010). Marital status is a signifi-
cant predictor of citizenship status amongst immigrants (Yang, 1994). To be specific,
higher family stability increases the probability of having citizenship status for two
Table 1 Current citizenship regime in the six selected countries
Country Citizenship law Eligible persons
Belgium Modifications to the
Belgium Nationality Code
of 1 January 2003 and
Act of 4 December 2012
By residence: foreign citizens if residing in Belgium at least
5 years. Sufficient knowledge of one of the three national
languages should be provided.
By birth: children born in Belgium of a Belgian parent and
children born abroad of a Belgian parent. If both child and
parent were born abroad, the parent must make a
statement before the child reaches the age of 5
requesting that Belgian citizenship be granted to the child.
France French Civil Code of 1804
and Law n. 170 of 16
March 1998
By residence: foreign citizens if residing in France at least 5
years. Language skills and understanding of rights and
responsibilities of a French citizen have to be
demonstrated.
By birth: children born in France to at least one parent
who is also born in France. A child born in France to
foreign parents may acquire French citizenship at 18, if
residing in France at least 5 years since the age of 11.
Germany Immigration Act of 2004
and subsequent reforms
By residence: foreign citizens if residing in Germany at least
8 years. Sufficient knowledge of German language should
be provided. The successful attendance at an integration
course reduces the required time of lawful residence for
naturalisation from 8 to 7 years.
By birth: children born in Germany who have either 8 years
of residence before turning 21, or have attended a
German school for at least 6 years. Children who have not
been raised in Germany are subject to the ‘option duty’: if
they do not declare an intention to keep German
citizenship on reaching the age of 18, they will lose the
German nationality.
Italy Law n. 91/1992 By residence: EU citizens if residing in Italy at least 4 years;
stateless citizens if residing in Italy at least 5 years; non-EU
citizens if residing in Italy at least 10 years.
By birth: legal Italian residents until the age of 18 can
apply within 1 year of turning 18.
Portugal Law n. 37/1981 and
subsequent reforms
By residence: foreign citizens if residing in Portugal at least
6 years. Sufficient knowledge of the Portuguese language
and effective links to the national community are required.
By birth: children of a Portuguese parent who was born on
Portuguese territory or children born in a Portuguese
territory of non-Portuguese parents if the latter have re-
sided in Portugal for 5 years.
Spain Spanish Civil Code of
1978 and subsequent
reforms
By residence: foreign citizens if residing in Spain at least 8
years; foreign citizens coming from one of the Spanish
former colonies if residing in Spain at least 2 years.
By birth: children born of a Spanish parent or children
born in Spain of foreign parent who was also born in
Spain.
Source: Own elaboration of various sources
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reasons. Firstly, family stability is linked to the immigrants’ length of residence in the
new country of residence. As shown below, this is considered an important require-
ment by all naturalisation laws (in combination with other factors, such as evidence of
social and economic integration and knowledge of the national language). Secondly,
spouses and children benefit more from a long duration of residence and stabilisation
in the host society than do immigrants without such a family status in the country of
residence, because of the possibility of family reunification and naturalisation.
Human capital represents an essential condition for positive incorporation into the
host society and it constitutes a fundamental starting point for succeeding in the labour
market (Schneider & Crul, 2010). In this regard, evidence shows that education im-
proves the socio-economic status and occupational attainment of immigrants and their
descendants (Di Bartolomeo, 2011), so increasing their probability of being naturalised
(e.g. Koopmans, 2016). Moreover, as much importance has recently been attached to a
knowledge of the language and civic values of the country of residence (being new re-
quirements, which applicants for citizenship have to meet (Joppke, 2012)), educational
achievement appears to increase an immigrant’s chances of obtaining citizenship status
in the new country of residence. Thus, highly educated immigrants would be expected
to be more likely to have citizenship status than less-educated immigrants. Moreover,
economic and financial conditions have a significant effect on citizenship status
amongst immigrants: the more stable an immigrant’s labour and financial conditions,
the higher the likelihood the immigrant will have citizenship status in the new country
of residence. At the same time, the acquisition of citizenship status can be interpreted
as a way of improving the stabilisation of immigrants, their labour opportunities in the
country of residence and chances of mobility (Massey, Durand, & Pren, 2015), espe-
cially in times of economic recession. Finally, an immigrant’s area of origin and the
linkages arising, for instance, from colonial and post-colonial links between the coun-
tries of origin and residence, can influence the acquisition of citizenship status (Cesareo
& Blangiardo, 2009; Yang, 1994). The case of Filipinos and Latin Americans living in
Spain or in Portugal is one example (Tran, 2017).
As regards the ‘immigration’ variables, the number of years an immigrant spends in the
country of residence increases their likelihood of being naturalised (Piché, 2004). Immi-
grants with a longer duration of residence are less likely to be excluded or discriminated
against at a social and economic level, and they are generally more likely to have established
a solid relationship with the host society. As regards the time of arrival in the country of
residence, it is generally acknowledged (e.g. Alba & Nee, 2003; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001)
that the age on arrival or the immigrant generation influence the cultural, political and
socio-economic assimilation of immigrants. Specifically, immigrants who migrate at a youn-
ger age, and therefore socialise in the country of residence, will have more opportunities for
better integration than those who migrate at an older age, especially in terms of language
proficiency, educational attainment, labour opportunities and household income (e.g. Rum-
baut, 1997). Status on entry to the country of residence, which can be considered as a proxy
for the reason for migration or the migration channel, is a predictor of the likelihood an im-
migrant will be naturalised in the country of residence. In particular, it can predict the likeli-
hood of permanent residence and the likelihood that they will participate in the labour
market of the host society in the long term, thus influencing the immigrant’s integration
and incorporation into the host society.
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In sum, higher education, economic status, perceived financial well-being and duration
of residence appear to increase the likelihood of young and adult immigrants having citi-
zenship status, as they are indicators of assimilation into the country of residence.
However, such factors, though important, only constitute some of the elements of the
more comprehensive issue of immigrant citizenship status in Europe. National citizen-
ship policies, which establish the rules for obtaining citizenship status in the country of
residence, are fundamental for completing this picture. In particular, international lit-
erature (e.g. Bauböck & Helbling, 2011) has highlighted that the residence requirement
for naturalisation, toleration of dual citizenship and policy outcomes, such as the natur-
alisation rate and the proportion of foreign citizens (resident population with citizen-
ship of a foreign country), can affect access to citizenship status. In particular, a higher
number of years of residence required for naturalisation can decrease the likelihood
that immigrants will have citizenship status in the new country of residence. As an in-
dicator of the degree of inclusiveness of the immigrant’s receiving country and the per-
meability of its material and immaterial boundaries (Howard, 2005), toleration of dual
citizenship, i.e. the possibility that naturalised citizens can retain their native citizen-
ship, appears to favour citizenship status amongst newcomers, since it does not change
their sense of belonging to their country of origin. Moreover, as claimed by Howard
(2009), the naturalisation rate, which measures the ratio between the yearly number of
naturalisations and the number of foreign citizens living in a country, can depend on
both the naturalisation policy and on foreign citizen demand, which I believe to be mu-
tually dependent. Thus, the higher the naturalisation rate, the higher the likelihood that
immigrants will have citizenship status in their new country of residence. Finally, in
contrast to the detrimental effect of a high proportion of foreign citizens on the immi-
grant integration process, as found by Cesareo and Blangiardo (2009), I would argue
that the proportion of foreign citizens living in a country may influence citizenship sta-
tus amongst immigrants positively, since it indicates openness and an inclination of the
host society to welcome newcomers and potential new citizens. The proportion of for-
eign citizens in a country may depend on several factors, the combination of which
may result in a large foreign population; therefore, all things being equal, the host
country may promote a legislation that recognises its immigrants as permanent resi-
dents and then citizens. These considerations become even truer if only non-EU for-
eign citizens are considered. Non-EU citizens are more culturally distant and,
therefore, more difficult to be integrated, compared to EU citizens. Moreover, the latter
benefit from the free circulation regime in the Schengen area and from an easier access
to citizenship rights in some European immigration countries, compared to the former.
Data, measures and method
Data
Individual-level data come from the Immigrant Citizens Survey (ICS), conducted by the
King Baudouin Foundation and the Migration Policy Group, from October 2011 to
January 2012. Seven thousand four hundred sixty-eight immigrants were surveyed in
the following countries and cities: Belgium (Antwerp, Brussels and Liège), France (Lyon
and Paris), Germany (Berlin and Stuttgart), Hungary (Budapest), Italy (Milan and
Naples), Portugal (Faro, Lisbon and Setubal) and Spain (Barcelona and Madrid).
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However, Hungary was omitted from the sample because it cannot easily be set within
one of the four traditional national immigration and integration models; the dataset
was therefore reduced to 6255 individuals. The ICS survey is aimed at those not born
in the country of residence (although immigrated as minors), those who are or were
non-EU citizens or stateless persons (born as citizen of country other than EU/EEA
countries or Switzerland), those who have been living in the country for more than a
year, those holding or renewing legal immigrant status and being 15 years of age or
older. The survey deals with the following topics: employment, languages, civic and
political participation, family reunion, long-term residence and citizenship.
Country-level data come from a systematic review of national citizenship policies,
academic literature and the Eurostat database.
Individual-level measures: demographic, human capital and ‘immigration’ variables
The key dependent variable is nationality, which is a dummy variable where 1 indicates
the respondent has citizenship status in the country of residence and 0 indicates that
they do not. From the previous literature, I selected the following demographic vari-
ables as individual-level independent measures: (a) respondents’ age, measured in years;
(b) gender, represented by the dummy variable male (reference category) and female;
(c) marital status, distinguishing between ‘legally married or in civil union’ (reference
category), ‘legally separated, divorced or dissolved civil union’, ‘living with a partner’,
‘widowed or civil partner deceased’ and ‘single’; (d) area of origin, distinguishing be-
tween ‘Asia’ (reference category), ‘Eastern Europe’, ‘Latin America’, ‘Middle East’, ‘North
Africa’ and ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’ and finally (e) former colony, measured by a dummy
variable (0/1) indicating whether the respondent’s country of origin is a former colony
of his/her new country of residence (for instance, the Spanish-speaking countries of
Latin America for Spain, and Brazil for Portugal) or not (reference category). As
regards the human capital variables, I selected the following: (f ) current economic situ-
ation, distinguishing between ‘in paid work’ (reference category), ‘in education’, ‘un-
employed’, ‘retired, sick or disabled’ and ‘homemaker or other’; (g) perceived financial
well-being, distinguishing between ‘comfortable’ (reference category), ‘sufficient’, ‘diffi-
cult’ and ‘very difficult’ and finally (h) educational attainment, referring to the number
of years spent in education.1 As ‘immigration’ variables, I selected firstly, (i) years since
migration, referring to the number of years lived in the country of residence, measured
by the difference between the year of the interview and the year of arrival in the coun-
try of residence. Secondly, (l) status on entry, distinguishing between ‘work or study’
(reference category), ‘family reunion’, ‘permanent-long term’, ‘humanitarian’, ‘other legal
status’ and ‘other illegal status’. Thirdly, (m) respondents’ immigrant generation, distin-
guishing between the first (reference category) and 1.5. To be precise, first generation
means those who migrated at 18 and over years of age, whilst 1.5 generation includes
those who migrated at under 18 years of age, according to a simplified version of the
definition given by Rumbaut (1997).
As shown in Table 2, the proportion of immigrants holding citizenship status in the
country of residence varies widely between countries, with Belgium and France being
the most favourable for the granting of citizenship status to immigrants and Italy being
the least favourable.
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The definitions of the independent individual-level measures along with their per-
centage, mean and standard deviation are reported in Table 3. They help to shed light
on the respondents’ individual characteristics. The average age of immigrants residing
in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain is 38.2 years. Females represent
51.2%. Whilst most of the immigrants are married (52.1%), 29.7% are single; 7.9% are
legally separated, divorced or have had a civil union dissolved; 6.9% are living with their
partner and 2.7% are widowed. As regards the area of origin, 22.6% of immigrants come
from Latin America, 16.6% from Eastern Europe, 18.6% from Sub-Saharan Africa,
16.6% from North Africa, 13.1% from Asia and 11.6% from the Middle East. It is inter-
esting to note that 38% of the respondents’ countries of origin were former colonies of
their new countries of residence. As for their current economic situation, 57.9% have
paid work, 19.1% are unemployed, 9.8% are in education, 7.2% are homemakers or
other and 5.3% are retired, sick or disabled. Regarding their financial well-being, 14.9%
of the respondents are comfortably well-off, 45.5% sufficiently so, 25.4% are in difficult
financial circumstances and 12.9% very difficult. Educational attainment is quite high,
equal to 10.7 years of education on average. When immigration variables are consid-
ered, the number of years since migration is on average 13.8. On average, three out of
four respondents are first-generation immigrants, whilst one in four is from the 1.5
generation. Moreover, the respondents entered the country of residence with the fol-
lowing status: 32.5% work or study, 27.9% family reunion, 8.3% permanent-long term,
11.9% humanitarian, 12% another legal status and 4.2% other illegal status.
Country-level measures: national citizenship policies
I identified four measures of national citizenship policies consistent with the aspects of
national citizenship policy discussed above. Firstly, the residence requirement for natur-
alisation, a discrete variable, which measures the number of years foreign citizens re-
quire for naturalisation in the new country of residence. Since the variable assumes
only four values (5, 6, 8 and 10), it has been made dichotomous: it takes value 1 if the
number of years required for naturalisation is equal to 5 or 6 and value 2 if the number
of years required for naturalisation is equal to 8 or 10. Secondly, toleration of dual citi-
zenship, a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not foreign citizens acquiring
citizenship rights in the new country of residence can keep their previous citizenship.
Third, the naturalisation rate, the ratio between the yearly number of naturalisations
and the number of foreign citizens in a country (Eurostat online database). Finally, the
proportion of foreign citizens, a continuous variable measuring the number of foreign
Table 2 Immigrants by citizenship status in six selected countries of residence, between 2011 and
2012. Percentage values and number of cases
Immigrant
citizenship
Country of residence Total
Belgium France Germany Italy Portugal Spain
Nationals 47.5 42.0 15.2 6.6 23.4 38.4 28.9
Foreign nationals 52.5 58.0 84.8 93.4 76.6 61.6 71.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
No. of cases 1024 981 1201 797 1258 994 6255
% by country 16.4 15.7 19.2 12.7 20.1 15.9 100.0
Source: Own elaboration of ICS data
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics on independent individual-level variables. Sample of immigrants
(N = 6255) in six selected countries of residence, between 2011 and 2012
Independent variables % or mean and (SD)
Demographic variables
Age (in years) 38.2 (12.5)
Female 51.2
Marital status
- Legally married, civil union 52.1
- Legally separated, divorced, dissolved civil union 7.9
- Living with partner 6.9
- Single 29.7
- Widowed, civil partner deceased 2.7
Area of origin
- Asia 13.1
- Eastern Europe 16.6
- Latin America 22.6
- Middle East 11.6
- North Africa 16.6
- Sub-Saharan Africa 18.6
Former colony 38.0
Human capital variables
Perceived financial well-being
- Comfortable 14.9
- Sufficient 45.5
- Difficult 25.4
- Very difficult 12.9
Current economic situation
- In paid work 57.9
- Homemaker or other 7.2
- In education 9.8
- Retired, sick or disabled 5.3
- Unemployed 19.1
Educational attainment 10.7 (4.4)
Immigration variables
Years since migration 13.8 (10.6)
Immigrant generation
- 1st generation 75.3
- 1.5 generation 24.1
Status on entry
- Work or study 32.5
- Family reunion 27.9
- Permanent-long term 8.3
- Humanitarian 11.9
- Other legal status 12.0
- Other illegal status 4.2
The variables marital status, area of origin, perceived financial well-being, current economic situation,
immigrant generation and status on entry have missing values
Source: Own elaboration of ICS data
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citizens as a percentage of the total resident population (Eurostat online database). Al-
though it represents one of the key aspects of national citizenship policies, the variable
citizenship by birth, which measures whether or not children born to parents with for-
eign citizenship automatically receive citizenship rights in the country of their birth,
has not been taken into account, since the focus of this analysis are the young and
adult immigrants who were not born in their country of residence. Finally, civic integra-
tion has also been considered, but it was not statistically significant. In particular, I used
the CIVIX index, developed by Wallace Goodman (2014). It is based on three target
civic knowledge areas (country knowledge, language and values) in the EU–15, and it
goes from 0 to 6, where 0 means low civic integration requirements and 6 high civic in-
tegration requirements.
Table 4 shows detailed values for these policy variables. The four country-level mea-
sures considered in the empirical analysis reflect the individual-level data and therefore
refer to people not born in the country of residence, who are or were non-EU citizens
and who are holding or renewing a legal immigrant status in the new country of resi-
dence. However, in order to have a more complete picture, I presented the naturalisa-
tion rate of all foreign citizens and of non-EU foreign citizens only, on the one hand,
and the proportion of all foreign citizens and of non-EU foreign citizens only, on the
other hand, however, bearing in mind that only the data on non-EU foreign citizens are
employed in the empirical analysis. As expected, the data show that non-EU foreign cit-
izens are more interested in acquiring the citizenship status of the new country of resi-
dence, compared to all foreign citizens, and that, conversely, the proportion of non-EU
foreign citizens is lower if compared to that of all foreign citizens living in the six Euro-
pean countries considered in this study.
Of the countries represented here, Italy and Spain show the highest number of years
required for foreign citizens to be naturalised. As already noted, non-EU,
first-generation immigrants who intend to acquire Italian or Spanish citizenship require
10 years of residence. EU citizens only require 4 years of legal residence, but this does
not seem to be encouraging Romanians, the largest immigrant group residing in Italy,
to ask for Italian citizenship and therefore increase the Italian naturalisation rate, as
can be deduced from the comparison between the naturalisation rate of all foreign citi-
zens and that of non-EU foreign citizens only (1.45% and 1.77%, respectively). Spain
and Portugal have high naturalisation rates and proportions of foreign citizens. This is
because of Spanish legislation allowing some nationalities coming from former colonies
Table 4 Measures of national citizenship policies in the six selected countries in 2011
Country No. of years of
residence
required for
naturalisation
Toleration of
dual
citizenship (1
= yes; 0 = no)
Naturalisation
rate of all
foreign
citizens (in %)
Naturalisation rate
of non-EU foreign
citizens only (in
%)
Proportion
(%) of all
foreign
citizens
Proportion (%)
of non-EU for-
eign citizens
only
Belgium 5 1 2.56 5.52 11.04 3.7
France 5 1 2.96 4.06 6.04 3.8
Germany 8 0 1.52 2.37 9.05 4.8
Italy 10 1 1.45 1.77 6.82 4.9
Portugal 6 1 5.22 6.58 4.14 2.8
Spain 10 1 2.16 3.46 11.18 7.0
Source: Own elaboration of various sources
Paparusso Genus           (2019) 75:13 Page 13 of 23
to acquire citizenship after 2 years of uninterrupted legal residence without losing citi-
zenship of their country of birth. Similarly, citizens of the following former Portuguese
colonies are entitled to Portuguese citizenship if they were born during the period of
Portuguese rule: Angola, Cape Verde, Portuguese India, Guinea Bissau, East Timor,
Macao, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Principe. Indeed, Portugal has the highest
naturalisation rates amongst the considered countries (5.22% and 6.58% for all foreign
citizens and non-EU foreign citizens only, respectively). In the same way, the Italian
citizenship law (Law n. 91/1992) establishes that the foreign descendant until to the
second degree of an Italian citizen can acquire the Italian citizenship at the age of 18
and after having lived in Italy for at least 2 years. These special citizenship regimes may
influence the likelihood of acquiring the citizenship status in the country of residence
amongst young and adult immigrants. With the exception of Italy (the survey does not
provide information about the bloodline of the respondents), this effect will be con-
trolled with the variable former colony. Finally, Germany’s citizenship policy appears to
be one of the most restrictive in Europe, requiring 8 years of residence for naturalisa-
tion: as a consequence, despite the high proportion of foreign citizens (9.05%),
Germany has an extremely low naturalisation rate (1.52%), which however increases if
we consider non-EU foreign citizens only (2.37%).
Method
As my focus is on immigrant citizenship status as the result of both individual factors and
policy factors, my first idea was to use a multilevel logistic model, to analyse differences in
the probability of having citizenship status in the country of residence amongst young and
adult immigrants as the result of variations in the two different levels of independent vari-
ables. Level 1 variables are the individual characteristics of the immigrants and level 2 vari-
ables are the characteristics of the country. As generally acknowledged (e.g. Goldstein,
1999), the multilevel modelling technique is used to assess the effects of macro-level charac-
teristics on individuals because this method uses data in which units at one level are nested
within the units at the next level (Guo & Zhao, 2000; Hox, 1995). Nevertheless, some con-
cerns raised from the fact that the multilevel analysis was limited to six countries. In fact, ‘if
the number of groups is small, and even if the group sizes are large, estimates of the vari-
ance component and of their SEs are imprecise and likely to be biased downwards’ (Bryan
& Jenkins, 2016, p. 7). Although the mean immigrant sample size per country was rather
high (Simonsen, 2017), six countries were not enough to avoid unbiased results (Bryan &
Jenkins, 2016; Mills & Präg, 2016; Stegmueller, 2013). Given these considerations, I opted
for a cluster-robust analysis and therefore for a logistic regression model with cluster-robust
standard errors. Cluster-robust analysis is used when data are grouped into clusters, with
model errors uncorrelated across clusters but correlated within clusters (Cameron & Miller,
2015). Therefore, when individual-level cross-sectional data are clustered into geographical
areas, such as country, to control for within-cluster error correlation is very important in
order to obtain accurate standard errors and, thus, precise estimates.
Results: the role of individual and national factors
To analyse differences in the likelihood of citizenship status in the country of residence
in young and adult immigrants residing in six European countries as a result of
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variations in individual and policy factors, a logistic regression model with
cluster-robust standard errors has been performed. The results of this analysis are pre-
sented in Table 5. However, before starting to interpret the odds ratios, it is important
to point out that individual- and country-level measures have a mutual conditioning ef-
fect on the acquisition of citizenship status amongst young and adult immigrants resid-
ing in Europe. In particular, as regards the individual-level measures, since
heterogeneous factors have been taken into account, I argue that they may be selective
of immigrants who are more prone to acquire citizenship status in the country of resi-
dence and that they may also produce attitudes and values which increase an immi-
grant’s likelihood of acquiring citizenship status in the country of residence. However,
the data do not allow us to empirically test whether the relationship between
individual-level measures and citizenship status is selective or causally influenced
(Axinn & Thornton, 1992).
Findings on gender show that females are more likely to have citizenship status than
males. According to international literature (e.g. Itzigsohn & Giorguli-Saucedo, 2005),
females are more likely to experience positive incorporation into the host society than
their male counterparts, they are more likely to intend to remain permanently in the
country of residence and, therefore, more likely to naturalise. As for marital status, re-
sults show that those immigrants who are single, living with a partner, legally separated,
divorced or with have had a civil union dissolved are less likely to have citizenship sta-
tus than immigrants who are married or in civil unions. Literature has highlighted the
positive association between family stability and naturalisation (e.g. Yang, 1994). In par-
ticular, family stability indicates the presence of social capital (i.e. family networks),
more contacts within the country of residence, long-term and stable residence, less
intention of returning to the country of origin and, therefore, successful integration
into the country of residence (Barbiano di Belgiojoso, 2016). As regards the area of ori-
gin, immigrants from Sub-Saharan, Latin American and Eastern European countries
appear to be the most likely to have citizenship status in the new country of residence.
A special naturalisation regime provided for Latin Americans, the ethno-cultural and
geographical proximity to the country of origin of both Latin Americans and Eastern
Europeans (Cesareo & Blangiardo, 2009; Piché, 2004) plus the more deprived and pre-
carious living conditions in the original country characterising immigrants coming from
Sub-Saharan countries, are the relevant factors that explain this result. Similarly, immi-
grants from a country which was formerly a colony of their new country of residence
appear to be more likely to have citizenship status in their new country of residence
than immigrants from a country which was not a former colony of their new country
of residence. Former colony, which depends on colonial and post-colonial ties between
the countries of origin and residence, and which ‘make the former colonial state a pre-
ferred destination for people from the former colonies’ (Vezzoli & Flahaux, 2017, p. 3),
can mean use of the same language by both foreign and native citizens. This can help
to reduce the risks of social marginalisation and economic and professional segregation,
increasing, for example, the chances of being employed in medium and highly skilled
jobs and, more generally, of achieving successful integration into the new country of
residence (Penninx, 2003).
As for the human capital variables, findings for the current economic situation show
that immigrants who are homemakers or other and are retired, sick or disabled are less
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Table 5 Logistic regression with dependent variable nationality (N = 6255)
Odds ratios Significance
Demographic variables
Age 1.008
Female (ref. cat. = male) 1.247 **
Marital status (ref. cat. = legally married or civil union)
- Legally separated, divorced, dissolved civil union 0.938
- Living with partner 0.501 ***
- Single 0.776 **
- Widowed, civil partner deceased 1.099
Area of origin (ref. cat. = Asia)
- Eastern Europe 1.402 *
- Latin America 1.676 ***
- Middle East 1.013
- North Africa 1.309
- Sub-Saharan Africa 1.824 ***
Former colony 1.040 *
Human capital variables
Current economic situation (ref.
cat. = in paid work)
- Homemaker or other 0.732 *
- In education 0.857
- Retired, sick, disabled 0.558 **
- Unemployed 0.920
Perceived financial well-being
(ref. cat. = comfortable)
- Sufficient 0.726 **
- Difficult 0.751 *
- Very difficult 0.519 ***
Educational attainment (in years) 1.062 ***
Immigration variables
Years since migration 1.091 ***
1.5 generation (ref. cat. = first generation) 1.649 ***
Status on entry (ref. cat. = work or study)
- Family reunion 1.530 ***
- Permanent-long term 1.101
- Humanitarian 1.299 *
- Other legal status 0.838
- Other illegal status 0.669 **
National citizenship policies
8 or 10 years of residence required for naturalisation
(ref. cat. = 5 or 6 years)
0.125 ***
Toleration of dual citizenship 1.014
Naturalisation rate 1.386 ***
Proportion of foreign citizens 2.617 ***
Significance: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Source: Own elaboration of ICS data
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likely to be naturalised than those who are employed. This result can be interpreted in
the light of the neoclassical theory of migration (e.g. Todaro, 1969) according to which
immigrants who are not employed face more problems in actualising their immigration
and integration goals. They are therefore less equipped to apply for, and obtain, citizen-
ship status in their new country of residence. As is predictable, a worse perceived finan-
cial well-being decreases an immigrant’s likelihood of having citizenship status in the
new country of residence. Perceived financial well-being is a subjective indicator of in-
tegration, which can be considered a proxy for income and participation in the labour
market. It affects an immigrant’s legal status and mobility in the country of residence.
Income and participation in the labour market can particularly affect an immigrant’s
ability to become established in the host country, in terms of legal residence and stable
labour conditions (Morris, 2001), as well as affecting their chances of becoming part of
the host society and thus enjoying citizenship rights. Moreover, a definite annual in-
come can be a prerequisite for naturalisation, as is the case of Italy (Busetta, 2016;
Paparusso, Fokkema, & Ambrosetti, 2017). However, it is important to note that both the
current economic situation and perceived financial well-being variables may be hindered by
the selection process, which singles out immigrants who are successfully integrated for the
acquisition of citizenship status. Moreover, in paid work, immigrants could show higher fi-
nancial well-being compared to immigrants who are homemakers or other and are retired,
sick or disabled; therefore, results could be, to a certain extent, biased. As far as the lower
likelihood of naturalisation of homemakers, who generally are migrants reunited to partners
who are already in the country of residence, results will be clarified by the variable status on
entry, which will be discussed below. Education has a positive effect on the citizenship status
of immigrants: those who are more educated are more likely to have citizenship status than
those who are less educated. This result supports the position in the public debate in Eur-
ope which argues that citizenship rights should only be granted to immigrants who can
demonstrate that they have fully integrated and that they fulfil high integration require-
ments, such as further education and professional careers (Crul, Schneider, & Lelie, 2012;
Schneider & Crul, 2010).
As far as the ‘immigration’ variables are concerned, the number of years since migration
influences an immigrant’s likelihood of naturalisation, as recently highlighted by Peters et al.
(2015). Thus, the more years they have lived in the country of residence, the higher the like-
lihood that they will have citizenship status. Moreover, 1.5-generation immigrants are more
likely to have citizenship status than first-generation immigrants. This result supports the
literature on integration studies, which argues that immigrants who arrive at a younger age
are more integrated into the country of residence than immigrants who arrive at an older
age (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). Indeed, immigrant generation is considered a crucial com-
ponent of the integration process (Piché, 2004). In particular, previous studies show that mi-
grating at an early age can facilitate the process of incorporation, increase the sense of
belonging and the political participation in the host society and encourage the acquisition of
citizenship status in the new country of residence (e.g. Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). As for the
status on entry, results show that migrant families are the most likely to naturalise. Family
reunification is a ‘key source of immigration’ (Bosswick & Heckmann, 2006, p. 19). In par-
ticular, it is one of the major entry channels into European countries, especially for Mediter-
ranean countries (Reyneri, 2001). Family reunification generally implies that, having
migrated to join family members, the immigrants intend to settle permanently in the new
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country of residence, although with some exceptions to this behaviour that may depend on
immigrants’ country of origin, family migration models and projects, as recently found by
Barbiano di Belgiojoso and Terzera (2018). Moreover, family formation facilitates the natur-
alisation of immigrants and their descendants in European countries. Humanitarian immi-
grants also have a strong motivation for acquiring citizenship status in the country of
residence as it might give them more safety and freedom of movement; they will have had
to leave their own country for safety reasons.
When policy factors are considered, the results show that the residence requirement for
naturalisation decreases the likelihood of immigrants residing in European countries to nat-
uralise. A requirement for a higher number of years for naturalisation can reduce the desire
of immigrants to apply for citizenship status and reduce their chances of obtaining it. Con-
versely, toleration of dual citizenship by the country of residence is not statistically signifi-
cant. As regards the naturalisation rate and the proportion of foreign citizens, results show
a positive effect on the likelihood of having the citizenship status, since they are synonym-
ous with countries of residence, which are inclusive and proactive towards immigrants and
their descendants.
Discussion and conclusions
The aim of this paper was to examine the effect of both individual characteristics and mea-
sures of national citizenship policies on the likelihood of citizenship status amongst young
and adult immigrants living in European countries. Specifically, our research questions were
as follows: Which factors influence immigrant citizenship status the most? Do national citi-
zenship policies affect the citizenship status of immigrants living in European countries?
Are the traditional national immigration and integration models helpful in interpreting the
results? I have responded to these research questions by performing a logistic regression
model with cluster-robust standard errors on selected European countries using the data of
Immigrant Citizens Survey. This kind of statistical analysis is used when cross-sectional data
are grouped into clusters, with regression model errors independent across clusters but cor-
related within clusters (Cameron & Miller, 2015).
The empirical analysis highlighted the considerable effect of individual characteristics on
citizenship status. In particular, higher family stability, educational attainment, current eco-
nomic situation, perceived financial well-being, duration of residence and coming from a
country that is a former colony of their new country of residence appear to increase the like-
lihood of citizenship status amongst immigrants living in Europe, as they are synonymous
with a consolidated process of integration into the country of residence. However, the effect
of policy factors is also important. In particular, a lower residence requirement for natural-
isation and a more inclusive environment favour immigrants becoming citizens of the new
country of residence. These conditions seem to be characteristic of countries belonging to
the French integration model, where there is a more balanced relationship between a low
number of years of residence required for naturalisation, a relatively high naturalisation rate
and proportion of foreign citizens compared to other countries. Therefore, this seems to be
an optimal mix for promoting the acquisition of citizenship status amongst young and adult
immigrants. Indeed, the acquisition of citizenship status by immigrants perfectly reflects the
French integration model, according to which ‘members of some cultural community
abandon at least some of their customs and practices’ (Mason, 1999, p. 266). The French
‘Contrat d’accueil et de l’intégration’, introduced by the first Sarkozy Law of 2003 but made
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compulsory in 2007 after the second Sarkozy Law, and the ‘Integration Contract’ recently
included in the Belgian ‘Citizenisation’ policy show that the introduction of civic require-
ments has not been challenged by the shift from assimilationist to anti-discrimination pol-
icies. Ultimately, immigrants do not start to resemble native citizens by just adopting
similar social, economic and cultural behaviours, but also by acquiring the same rights and
duties. In this regard, citizenship status helps to reduce differences between foreign and na-
tive citizens, a marker of the integration paradigm.
Conversely, despite the special treatment of foreigners coming from former colonies in
Spain and Portugal, and therefore the high naturalisation rate and proportion of non-EU for-
eign citizens in these countries, Southern European countries are characterised by a ‘subor-
dinate integration’ (Ambrosini, 2005). Integration is mainly restricted to those segments of
the labour market, where there is a strong demand for unskilled and temporary work, which
does not (yet) conform with a process of granting immigrants the same civil and political par-
ticipation as the native citizens, as indicated by citizenship status. This is a distinctive feature
of the Southern European countries, contributing to the definition of the aforementioned
‘Southern European model of integration’. As far as Italy, this kind of approach towards inte-
gration becomes even more problematic if we consider that a turn towards the social and
cultural dimension of integration has occurred in the last decade (Paparusso, 2016). As a re-
sult of a long process started with the ‘Carta dei valori della cittadinanza e dell’integrazione’
(‘Charter of the values of citizenship and integration’), introduced by the Home Affairs Minis-
ter Giuliano Amato during the II Prodi Government in 2006, the Security Package (Law 94/
2009), approved by the IV Silvio Berlusconi Government in July 2009, has institutionalised
the importance of learning the Italian language and about Italian history and culture as a pre-
requisite for a positive and active inclusion of immigrants into the Italian society. Accord-
ingly, few days after the entry into the Italian territory, immigrants have to sign an
‘Integration Agreement’2 in order to obtain the permit of stay. One month before the expir-
ation of the Agreement, the knowledge of the Italian language, civic culture and civil life have
to be sufficiently proved by the immigrant through a test, whose failure means the denial of
the permit of stay. Moreover, successfully passing a language test is amongst the require-
ments asked to immigrants who apply for the residence permit for long-term residents. Gen-
erally, the integration of immigrants is considered the final step of a successful and durable
process of residence in the country of destination. With civic integration, the ability of immi-
grants to demonstrate to be integrated through the success in language and civic courses be-
comes a prerequisite of their entry and residence in the host country (Carbone, Gargiulo, &
Russo Spena, 2018; Vitiello, 2017). By this way, the relationship between immigration and in-
tegration has been inverted. Integration and immigration policies have been inextricably
linked, with integration that has been made functional to the entry and the residence of im-
migrants in a foreign country and that has been placed amongst the instruments and the pol-
icies of immigration control (Paparusso, 2017). Moreover, according to the ‘subordinate
integration’, immigrants ‘should stay behind, giving priority to Italians for the access to the
most skilled jobs, as well as to scarce social goods, such as public housing’ (Ambrosini, 2004,
p. 17), but they must follow a quite demanding path to enjoy the citizenship rights, demon-
strating an in-depth knowledge of the Italian language, the Constitution, society, institutions
and national customs to regularly reside and integrate in our country, if civic integration is
applied. This is an important paradox for a country whose immigrants represent a mature
component of its population and a pervasive trait of its society.
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This study has some limitations. Firstly, it does not take into account the behaviour of
multiculturalist countries as regards the concession of citizenship rights to immigrants. The
academic literature (e.g. Duyvendak & Scholten, 2011; Kymlicka, 2012) has shed light on the
debate about the effectiveness of multiculturalism in achieving its intended effects, especially
in granting immigrants equality and emancipation (Koopmans, 2010). In particular, one re-
search strand argues that since they emphasise ethnic and cultural particularisms, multicul-
tural policies risk ‘reinforcing ethnic stratification and ethno-cultural conflict’ (Bosswick &
Heckmann, 2006, p. 5), producing isolation and discouraging the process of reducing gaps
between nationals and non-nationals. Such considerations point to the need for more de-
tailed analysis of how holding citizenship rights works in a multiculturalist context. Indeed,
the dataset covers six European countries. For instance, Nordic countries, such as Sweden,
Finland and Norway, whose immigrants usually show higher levels of integration (MIPEX,
2015), are excluded. Secondly, the source used collects sample data from metropolitan cit-
ies; therefore, the sample is representative of immigrants who reside in urban areas. This as-
pect should be taken into account when interpreting the empirical results: the likelihood of
citizenship status amongst young and adult immigrants and the associated factors is not in-
dependent by the fact of living in urban contexts, where, as occurs for other integration pro-
cesses, the opportunities of acquiring the citizenship status may be higher compared to
rural areas (Balbo, 2009). Thirdly, as largely discussed in the paper, civic and language re-
quirements have become central in citizenship policies in European immigration countries
(Paparusso, 2016); nevertheless, as already noted, the variables that controlled for these fac-
tors at both individual and national levels and that I called having attended a civic or lan-
guage course and civic integration respectively, were not statistically significant. Moreover,
data refer to people not born in the country of residence, who are or were non-EU citizens
and who are holding or renewing a legal immigrant status in the new country of residence.
Therefore, results emerged by this work are not applicable and generalizable to all immi-
grants living in all Europe and can be drawn only partial policy conclusions. Finally, the
study is based on a cross-sectional survey conducted in the country of residence, which
means that immigrants who left the country of residence are not accounted for. In other
words, there may be a self-selection bias and any causal interpretation is not allowed. Future
studies could benefit from a longitudinal perspective.
These limitations notwithstanding, I believe that this study sheds important light on the
individual-level characteristics and measures of national citizenship policies linked to the ac-
quisition of citizenship status amongst young and adult foreign-born immigrants living in
some of the most consolidated countries of immigration and may contribute to a better un-
derstanding of these dynamics in other contexts. Moreover, the proposed results are consist-
ent with the idea that for the construction of a comprehensive European migration policy
the acquisition of citizenship for young and adult foreign-born immigrants is essential.
Endnotes
1I also considered the variable having attended a civic or language course, but it was
not statistically significant.
2The ‘Integration agreement’ (in Italian ‘Patto per l’integrazione’) has been approved
by the IV Silvio Berlusconi Government in 2009, but has entered into force in March
2012. The recent ‘Salvini’ Decree on Immigration and Security (Law Decree n. 113/
2018) has confirmed civic integration amongst the requirements of residence in Italy.
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